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Naïve Theories of Biology, Physics, and Psychology in Children with ASD.

Author(s): Poulin-Dubois D, Dutemple E, Burnside K

Theory of mind is defined as the understanding that mental states predict and explain people's behaviors. It develops around the age of 4 but seems to remain deficient in people with ASD, whereas other forms of naïve understanding remain intact. This st...

Article GUID: 33385282

Infants Generalize Beliefs Across Individuals.

Author(s): Burnside K, Neumann C, Poulin-Dubois D

It has been argued that infants possess a rich, sophisticated theory of mind (ToM) that is only revealed with tasks based on spontaneous responses. A mature (ToM) implies the understanding that mental states are person specific. Previous studies on infants&...

Article GUID: 33071864

Theory of mind development: State of the science and future directions.

Author(s): Poulin-Dubois D

This chapter offers a brief overview of how research on theory of mind development has developed over the recent years, with a focus on current research and theoretical accounts of theory of mind during the infancy period. The topics covered include the fac...

Article GUID: 32859285

Concurrent Validity of the Modified Checklist for Autism in Toddlers (M-CHAT): Socio-cognitive and Verbal Skills in 18-Month-Old Infants.

Author(s): Ruel A, Chiarella SS, Crivello C, Poulin-Dubois D

J Autism Dev Disord. 2020 Feb 04;: Authors: Ruel A, Chiarella SS, Crivello C, Poulin-Dubois D

Article GUID: 32020422

Selective social learning in infancy: looking for mechanisms.

Author(s): Crivello C, Phillips S, Poulin-Dubois D

Dev Sci. 2018 05;21(3):e12592 Authors: Crivello C, Phillips S, Poulin-Dubois D

Article GUID: 28856760

Probing the depth of infants' theory of mind: disunity in performance across paradigms.

Author(s): Poulin-Dubois D, Yott J

Dev Sci. 2018 Jul;21(4):e12600 Authors: Poulin-Dubois D, Yott J

Article GUID: 28952180

Knowing who knows: Metacognitive and causal learning abilities guide infants' selective social learning.

Author(s): Kuzyk O, Grossman S, Poulin-Dubois D

Dev Sci. 2019 Sep 13;:e12904 Authors: Kuzyk O, Grossman S, Poulin-Dubois D

Article GUID: 31519037

Social orienting predicts implicit false belief understanding in preschoolers.

Author(s): Burnside K, Wright K, Poulin-Dubois D

J Exp Child Psychol. 2018 11;175:67-79 Authors: Burnside K, Wright K, Poulin-Dubois D

Article GUID: 30025256

Toddlers' attention to intentions-in-action in learning novel action words.

Author(s): Poulin-Dubois D, Forbes JN

Dev Psychol. 2002 Jan;38(1):104-14 Authors: Poulin-Dubois D, Forbes JN

Article GUID: 11806694

The developmental origins of naïve psychology in infancy.

Author(s): Poulin-Dubois D, Brooker I, Chow V

Adv Child Dev Behav. 2009;37:55-104 Authors: Poulin-Dubois D, Brooker I, Chow V

Article GUID: 19673160

The effects of bilingualism on toddlers' executive functioning.

Author(s): Poulin-Dubois D, Blaye A, Coutya J, Bialystok E

J Exp Child Psychol. 2011 Mar;108(3):567-79 Authors: Poulin-Dubois D, Blaye A, Coutya J, Bialystok E

Article GUID: 21122877

Biological motion primes the animate/inanimate distinction in infancy.

Author(s): Poulin-Dubois D, Crivello C, Wright K

PLoS One. 2015;10(2):e0116910 Authors: Poulin-Dubois D, Crivello C, Wright K

Article GUID: 25659077

The eyes know it: Toddlers' visual scanning of sad faces is predicted by their theory of mind skills.

Author(s): Poulin-Dubois D, Hastings PD, Chiarella SS, Geangu E, Hauf P, Ruel A, Johnson A

PLoS One. 2018;13(12):e0208524 Authors: Poulin-Dubois D, Hastings PD, Chiarella SS, Geangu E, Hauf P, Ruel A, Johnson A

Article GUID: 30521593


Title:The developmental origins of naïve psychology in infancy.
Authors:Poulin-Dubois DBrooker IChow V
Link:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19673160?dopt=Abstract
Category:Adv Child Dev Behav
PMID:19673160
Dept Affiliation: CRDH
1 Centre for Research in Human Development, Department of Psychology (py-170), Concordia University, 7141 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, Quebec, H4B 1R6, Canada.

Description:

The developmental origins of naïve psychology in infancy.

Adv Child Dev Behav. 2009;37:55-104

Authors: Poulin-Dubois D, Brooker I, Chow V

Abstract

Research interest in children's understanding of the mind goes back as far as Piaget's claim that children are cognitively egocentric (Flavell, 2000). Many years later, research on the understanding of the mind was revived in a paper that sought evidence for a theory of mind, not for children but for chimpanzees (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). The researchers claimed that chimpanzees' ability to predict what a human actor will do to achieve certain goals implies that the animal attributes mental states to the actor. This seminal paper generated a flurry of studies on theory of mind in nonhuman primates. A review of this research based on several different experimental paradigms concluded that chimpanzees understand others in terms of a perception-goal psychology (i.e., they can perceive what the other's goal is but not understand the mental states associated with the goal), as opposed to a full-fledged, human-like belief-desire psychology (Call & Tomasello, 2008). Around the same time, research on children's understanding of the mind was revived in a landmark paper by Wimmer and Perner (1983) and by other developmentalists (Bretherton, McNew, & Beegly-Smith. 1981). In line with the research on nonhuman primates, part of the progress that has been made in recent years is a recognition that theory of mind knowledge is acquired in an extended series of developmental milestones and that this development is based on a rich set of socio-cognitive abilities that develop in infancy (Wellman, 2002). The evidence outlined in the sections of this chapter suggests that infants possess a nascent understanding of mental states that older children use in explaining and predicting human behavior. Researchers have learned a great deal about the developmental origins of naive psychology in infancy. Nevertheless, the depth of infants' understanding of human behavior is still a controversial issue. For example, a popular paradigm in naive psychology is violation of expectancy. In false-belief tasks, infants look longer at a scene.in which a protagonist searches for an object in a location she does not know than at a scene in which the protagonist searches for an object in a location where she has previously seen the object disappear. The fact that no active behavioral response is required makes many researchers doubt that an infants' looking pattern reflects a deep level of understanding. Looking pattern may simply reflect the infants' detection that something in the scene is novel (e.g., protagonist looks at a location different than the one infants last saw her look at). Indeed this interpretation may account for the conflicting results in recent studies (e.g., Poulin-Dubois et al., 2007; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian et al., 2007). Poulin-Dubois et al. (2007) recently reported that the ability to distinguish between knowledge and ignorance (true belief) is absent at 14 months of age and still fragile at 18 months in a violation-of-expectancy task depicting videotaped human actors. In contrast, false-belief attribution to a computer animated caterpillar has been reported in 13-month-old infants (Surian et al., 2007). Given that infants have had more experience with humans looking at objects than with a caterpillar's looking behavior, the current evidence for an implicit understanding of advanced mental states such as false belief should be interpreted with caution. As is the case for nonhuman primate research, infants' mind-reading success might be accounted for by a simple behavior-reading explanation