Keyword search (4,164 papers available)

"Burnside K" Authored Publications:

Title Authors PubMed ID
1 Naïve Theories of Biology, Physics, and Psychology in Children with ASD. Poulin-Dubois D, Dutemple E, Burnside K 33385282
PSYCHOLOGY
2 Testing the stability of theory of mind: A longitudinal approach Poulin-Dubois D; Azar N; Elkaim B; Burnside K; 33152000
CRDH
3 Infants Generalize Beliefs Across Individuals. Burnside K, Neumann C, Poulin-Dubois D 33071864
PSYCHOLOGY
4 Social orienting predicts implicit false belief understanding in preschoolers. Burnside K, Wright K, Poulin-Dubois D 30025256
PSYCHOLOGY
5 Infants attribute false beliefs to a toy crane Burnside K; Severdija V; Poulin-Dubois D; 31309631
CRDH

 

Title:Infants Generalize Beliefs Across Individuals.
Authors:Burnside K,  Neumann C,  Poulin-Dubois D
Link:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33071864
DOI:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.547680
Publication:Frontiers in psychology
Keywords:false belief;  infancy;  theory of mind;  true belief;  violation-of-expectation; 
PMID:33071864 Category:Front Psychol Date Added:2020-10-21
Dept Affiliation: PSYCHOLOGY
1 Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montréal, QC, Canada.

Description:

Infants Generalize Beliefs Across Individuals.

Front Psychol. 2020; 11:547680

Authors: Burnside K, Neumann C, Poulin-Dubois D

Abstract

It has been argued that infants possess a rich, sophisticated theory of mind (ToM) that is only revealed with tasks based on spontaneous responses. A mature (ToM) implies the understanding that mental states are person specific. Previous studies on infants' understanding of motivational mental states, such as goals and preferences have revealed that, by 9 months of age, infants do not generalize these motivational mental states across agents. However, it remains to be determined if infants also perceive epistemic states as person specific. Therefore, the goal of the present study was to use a switch agent paradigm with the classic false belief violation-of-expectation task. Results revealed that 16-month-old infants attributed true and false beliefs to a naïve agent - they did not perceive beliefs as person specific. These findings indicate that the mechanisms that underlie infants' implicit attribution of beliefs differ from those assumed for explicit reasoning about beliefs.

PMID: 33071864 [PubMed]




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