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Naïve Theories of Biology, Physics, and Psychology in Children with ASD.

Author(s): Poulin-Dubois D, Dutemple E, Burnside K

Theory of mind is defined as the understanding that mental states predict and explain people's behaviors. It develops around the age of 4 but seems to remain deficient in people with ASD, whereas other forms of naïve understanding remain intact. This st...

Article GUID: 33385282
Infants Generalize Beliefs Across Individuals.

Author(s): Burnside K, Neumann C, Poulin-Dubois D

It has been argued that infants possess a rich, sophisticated theory of mind (ToM) that is only revealed with tasks based on spontaneous responses. A mature (ToM) implies the understanding that mental states are person specific. Previous studies on infants&...

Article GUID: 33071864
Social orienting predicts implicit false belief understanding in preschoolers.

Author(s): Burnside K, Wright K, Poulin-Dubois D

J Exp Child Psychol. 2018 11;175:67-79 Authors: Burnside K, Wright K, Poulin-Dubois D

Article GUID: 30025256
Title:Infants Generalize Beliefs Across Individuals.
Authors:Burnside K,  Neumann C,  Poulin-Dubois D
Link:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33071864
DOI:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.547680
Category:Front Psychol
PMID:33071864
Dept Affiliation: PSYCHOLOGY
1 Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montréal, QC, Canada.

Description:

Infants Generalize Beliefs Across Individuals.

Front Psychol. 2020; 11:547680

Authors: Burnside K, Neumann C, Poulin-Dubois D

Abstract

It has been argued that infants possess a rich, sophisticated theory of mind (ToM) that is only revealed with tasks based on spontaneous responses. A mature (ToM) implies the understanding that mental states are person specific. Previous studies on infants' understanding of motivational mental states, such as goals and preferences have revealed that, by 9 months of age, infants do not generalize these motivational mental states across agents. However, it remains to be determined if infants also perceive epistemic states as person specific. Therefore, the goal of the present study was to use a switch agent paradigm with the classic false belief violation-of-expectation task. Results revealed that 16-month-old infants attributed true and false beliefs to a naïve agent - they did not perceive beliefs as person specific. These findings indicate that the mechanisms that underlie infants' implicit attribution of beliefs differ from those assumed for explicit reasoning about beliefs.

PMID: 33071864 [PubMed]